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Preference Matching, Income, and Population Distribution 
in Urban and Adjacent Rural Regions  
Abstract 
 We analyze the impact of preference matching and income on the distribution of the 
population in an aggregate economy consisting of an urban and an adjacent rural region. It costs 
more (less) to live in the urban (rural) region. Individuals choose freely to live either in the urban 
or in the rural region. They differ in their incomes. These incomes are uniformly distributed on 
the unit interval. Our analysis leads to four results. First, when the cost differential parameter 
satisfies a condition, both regions are occupied in the equilibrium. Second, when this parametric 
condition holds, in any equilibrium in which the mean income of individuals varies across the 
two regions, every resident of the rural region has a lower income than every resident of the 
urban region. Third, there exists an income threshold and all individuals with higher (lower) 
incomes choose to live in the urban (rural) region. Finally, in the equilibrium with income 
sorting, it is possible to make everyone better off by slightly modifying their residential choices. 
Keywords: Income, Population Distribution, Preference Matching, Rural Region, Urban Region  
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1. Introduction 
Development economists and regional scientists have both been interested in studying 
rural and urban regions but typically for different reasons. Development economists have pointed 
out that the process of development tends to be uneven and that this unevenness leads to rapid 
growth in some parts of the economy while other parts are left behind to stagnate and even 
shrink. As such, it is no surprise to learn from a prominent development economics text---see 
Ray (1998, p. 345)---that by “far the most important structural feature of developing countries is 
the distinction between the rural and the urban sector.” Today, this dichotomy may hold in some 
developing nations but it is not a very useful way of thinking about regions in an increasingly 
urbanizing world. 
Using the lens of development economics, urban regions are typically dynamic, they 
display relatively rapid rates of economic growth, they are industrial, and they are often 
technologically advanced. In contrast, rural regions are generally not as dynamic, they are 
frequently agricultural, they display slow economic growth rates, and they are technologically 
backward. This perspective explains why the early literature in development economics---see 
Lewis (1954), Sen (1966), and Rakshit (1982)---was preoccupied with the modeling and the 
analysis of the so called dual economy. Even so, it should be noted that this traditional focus on 
dual development has changed substantially in the past few decades.4  
Unlike development economists, regional scientists have focused primarily on rural and 
urban regions in the developed world. Even though they have recognized that many rural regions 
in the developed world are agricultural in nature, in the main, regional scientists have not studied 
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rural regions as the provider of resource flows to urban regions in a dual economy setting. 
Instead, they have pointed to rural-urban disparities in metrics such as education (Jordan et al. 
(2014), health (Hall et al. 2006), and income (Yamamoto 2008). This focus has led regional 
scientists to address questions pertaining to the viability of rural regions as independent entities 
in the face of ever increasing urbanization and the concomitant rise of cities.5 In turn, this 
concern with the viability of rural regions has now given rise to a literature on the connections 
between so called “leading” and “lagging” regions where, unsurprisingly, rural regions are 
frequently the lagging regions.6  
The historical view of rural regions as backward notwithstanding, in many of the so 
called Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, this view is 
flawed. In this regard, the work of Ward and Brown (2009), Korpela et al. (2010), and Skelhorn 
et al. (2014) tells us that in many OECD nations, rural regions are energetic and vibrant places 
because of, inter alia, a low population density, an abundance of natural landscapes, and a clean, 
healthy, and safe environment. Despite the energy and the vibrancy of rural regions, Ward and 
Brown (2009, p. 1237) rightly note that “[r]arely are rural and urban areas, and the complex 
flows and relationships which bind them together, considered in an integrated and holistic way.”  
Given this state of affairs, we would now like to emphasize three points. First, the 
literature on leading and lagging regions has theoretically studied linkages between rural and 
urban regions but the linkages studied thus far7 are typically production or technology related 
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See Alberto and Glaeser (1995), Bettencourt (2013) and Kourtit et al. (2015) for additional details on this point. 
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linkages. Second, despite the increasing salience of the interactions between the residents of 
urban regions and adjacent rural regions,8 there are no theoretical studies of these interactions. 
Finally, the interactions mentioned in the second point above are directly related to the 
preferences of the residents and they have very little to do with either production or 
technological factors.  
Given the lacuna in the literature noted in the preceding paragraph, our basic objective in 
this paper is to analyze the impact of preference matching and income on the distribution of the 
population in an aggregate economy consisting of an urban region and an adjacent rural region. 
Section 2 delineates the theoretical framework. In this framework, it is more expensive to live in 
the urban region than in the adjacent rural region. Individuals choose freely to live either in the 
urban or in the rural region. However, they differ in their incomes and these (random) incomes 
are uniformly distributed on the interval ሾ0, 1ሿ. Section 3 shows that when a parameter in our 
model satisfies a particular condition (on which more below), both regions are occupied in the 
equilibrium. Section 4 supposes that the section 3 parametric condition holds and then 
demonstrates that in any equilibrium in which the mean income of individuals varies across the 
two regions, every resident of the rural region has a lower income than every resident of the 
urban region. Section 5 solves for an income threshold ܫ∗ and then points out that all individuals 
with incomes higher (lower) than this threshold choose to live in the urban (rural) region. Section 
6 notes that in the equilibrium with income sorting, it is possible to make everyone better off by 
slightly modifying their residential choices. Finally, section 7 concludes and then discusses two 
extensions of the research described in this paper.  
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See Pateman (2011), Long and Reed (2013), Millsap (2017), and Kimhi and Menahem-Carmi (2017) for further details on this 
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2. The Theoretical Framework 
 The aggregate economy of interest is made up of a rural and an urban region. We index 
these two regions with the subscript ݆ where ݆ ൌ ܴ, ܷ. The subscript ܴ denotes the rural region 
and the subscript ܷ denotes the urban region. Consistent with existing evidence---see Pateman 
(2011) and Long and Reed (2013)---we suppose that it is more expensive to live in the urban 
region than in the adjoining rural region. Specifically, it costs ܿோ ൐ 0 to live in the rural region 
and ܿ௎ ൌ ܿோ ൅ ߠ to live in the urban region where ߠ ൐ 0. We suppose that ܿோ and ܿ௎ are 
constant over space and time.  
Individuals in our aggregate economy differ in terms of their incomes. These incomes, 
which we denote by ܫ, are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval ሾ0, 1ሿ. It is 
important to understand that individuals in our aggregate economy care about the incomes of 
those living in their region. The mean income in region ݆ ൌ ܴ, ܷ is a function of the average 
value of ܫ in that region and we denote this mean by ܫመ௝, ݆ ൌ ܴ, ܷ.  
An individual with income ܫ who chooses to live in region ݆ with mean income ܫመ௝ obtains 
gross utility denoted by ௝ܷ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ܫሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመ௝൯. We know that this same individual bears a cost of 
living in region ݆ that is given by ௝ܿ . Therefore, putting these two pieces of information together, 
this individual’s net utility function is  
௝ܷ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ܫሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመ௝൯ െ ௝ܿ.      (1) 
Inspecting equation (1), it should be clear to the reader that richer individuals place a greater 
value on living together with other rich individuals.9 This is the sense in which the net utility 
function in equation (1) displays the phenomenon of preference matching that we alluded to in 
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the last paragraph of section 1.10 Our next task is to study a particular circumstance involving the 
parameter ߠ in which individuals reside in both the rural and in the urban regions in the 
equilibrium.  
3. Individuals Reside in Both Regions 
Suppose that all the individuals in our aggregate economy make their residential choices 
simultaneously. In addition, suppose that the difference in the cost of living between the urban 
region and the adjacent rural region is neither too high nor too low. We model this last feature by 
stipulating that the cost differential parameter ߠ߳ሺ0.5, 1ሻ. We now want to study the residential 
choices of all the individuals in an equilibrium which has the property that no individual wishes 
to move given the residential choices of everyone else in the aggregate economy.  
Let us begin by supposing that all individuals live in the rural region. The mean income 
now is ܫመோ ൌ 0.5. The point to note is that the poorest individual will now have no incentive to 
move to the urban region. To see this, observe that this individual’s net utility in the rural region 
is  
ܷோ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ 0ሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመோ൯ െ ܿோ ൌ 1.5 െ ܿோ.    (2) 
In contrast, if this poorest individual moves to the urban region then the mean income changes to 
ܫመ௎ ൌ 0. Note that for the moment, we are considering the case in which all individuals live in the 
rural region. So, there is zero population in the urban region. Also, the poorest individual has 
zero income. Therefore, when this poorest individual moves to the urban region, the population 
of the urban region consists of one person whose income is zero. Therefore, the mean income in 
                                                            
10  
Note that an individual’s decision to live either in the urban region or in the adjoining rural region does not tell us anything about 
where this individual works. Even though Loehr (2016), Helliwel et al. (2018), and others have written about the scenario in 
which an individual works in the urban region but lives in the rural region, and this is one possible outcome in our model, other 
scenarios are also possible. Since we are interested mainly in studying how the phenomenon of preference matching influences 
where individuals live, we do not model the commuting decisions of individuals who live in one region but choose to work in the 
other.  
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the urban region with this single resident who has zero income is also zero and in symbols we 
have ܫመ௎ ൌ 0. That said, the moving individual’s net utility in the urban region is  
ܷ௎ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ 0ሻሺ1 ൅ 0ሻ െ ܿோ െ ߠ ൌ 1 െ ܿோ െ ߠ,   (3) 
where the right-hand-side (RHS) follows because ܿ௎ ൌ ܿோ ൅ ߠ. Comparing the RHSs of 
equations (2) and (3), it is clear that the poorest individual benefits by staying in the rural region. 
 What about the richest individual? When residing in the rural region, this individual’s net 
utility is 
ܷோ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ 1ሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመோ൯ െ ܿோ ൌ 3 െ ܿோ    (4) 
because ܫመோ ൌ 0.5. In contrast, if this individual moves to the urban region in the model, then his 
net utility is  
ܷ௎ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ 1ሻ െ ܿோ െ ߠ ൌ 4 െ ܿோ െ ߠ   (5) 
since ܫመ௎ ൌ 1. When the richest individual moves from the rural region to the urban region, the 
population of the urban region increases from zero to one and this one person is the richest 
individual whose income is one. This is why we have ܫመ௎ ൌ 1. Now, inspecting the RHSs of 
equations (4) and (5) we see that the net utility from moving to the urban region exceeds the net 
utility from staying in the rural region when ߠ ൏ 1. This finding tells us that the richest 
individual may have an incentive to move to the urban region.  
 A similar line of reasoning tells us that if all individuals live in the urban region then the 
richest individual will gain nothing by moving to the adjoining rural region. In contrast, the 
poorest individual will gain by moving to the rural region as long as ߠ ൐ 0.5. Therefore, 
combining the arguments we have made thus far in this section, we conclude that the individuals 
populating our aggregate economy will choose to live in both the rural and in the urban regions 
in equilibrium as long as the cost differential parameter ߠ lies in the interval ሺ0.5, 1ሻ. Note that 
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our reasoning thus far has two additional implications for extreme values of ߠ. First, when ߠ ൐ 1, 
all the individuals in our aggregate economy will choose to live in the rural region exclusively. 
Second, when ߠ ൏ 0.5, all the individuals will live in the urban region and the rural region will 
have no residents. Let us now study the properties of the equilibrium when the condition 
ߠ߳ሺ0.5, 1ሻ holds and the mean income of individuals varies across the rural and the urban 
regions. 
4. Mean Income Varies Across the Two Regions 
We want to show that when the mean income varies across the two regions, every 
individual living in the rural region must have a lower income than every individual living in the 
urban region. To demonstrate this result, we proceed with a proof by contradiction. Now, 
suppose that an individual with high income ܫு lives in the rural region and that an individual 
with low income ܫ௅ lives in the urban region. Clearly, ܫு ൐ ܫ௅.  
If the residential choices supposed in the preceding paragraph constitute an equilibrium 
then it must be the case that  
ሺ1 ൅ ܫுሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመோ൯ െ ܿோ ൐ ሺ1 ൅ ܫுሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመ௎൯ െ ܿோ െ ߠ,   (6) 
and 
ሺ1 ൅ ܫ௅ሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመ௎൯ െ ܿோ െ ߠ ൐ ሺ1 ൅ ܫ௅ሻ൫1 ൅ ܫመோ൯ െ ܿோ.   (7) 
After several algebraic steps, the inequalities in (6) and (7) can be simplified to  
 
ఏ
ଵାூಹ ൐ ܫመ௎ െ ܫመோ	ܽ݊݀	ܫመ௎ െ ܫመோ ൐
ఏ
ଵାூಽ.     (8) 
 
The two inequalities in (8) together tell us that  
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ఏ
ଵାூಹ ൐
ఏ
ଵାூಽ,       (9) 
 
which is clearly false. Therefore, our initial supposition that an individual with high income ܫு 
lives in the rural region and that an individual with low income ܫ௅ lives in the urban region 
cannot be an equilibrium. In turn, this tells us that when ߠ߳ሺ0.5, 1ሻ and the mean income varies 
across the two regions, every individual living in the rural region must have a lower income than 
every individual living in the urban region. We now solve for an income threshold ܫ∗ and then 
show that all individuals with incomes higher (lower) than this threshold choose to live in the 
urban (rural) region.  
5. The Income Threshold 
 To summarize, we have demonstrated thus far that when the cost differential parameter 
ߠ߳ሺ0.5, 1ሻ, the individuals in our aggregate economy choose to live in both regions and that the 
total population of individuals is divided by income. Now suppose that the highest income in the 
rural region is ܫ∗. Then, the mean income in this region is 0.5ܫ∗. In addition, the mean income in 
the urban region now is 0.5ሺ1 ൅ ܫ∗ሻ. Since ܫ∗ is the threshold level of income, it follows that the 
individual with this level of income will be indifferent between residing in the rural and in the 
urban regions. Mathematically, we can express this indifference as 
ሺ1 ൅ ܫ∗ሻሺ1 ൅ 0.5ܫ∗ሻ െ ܿோ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ܫ∗ሻሼ1 ൅ 0.5ሺ1 ൅ ܫ∗ሻሽ െ ܿோ െ ߠ.   (10) 
Solving equation (10) for the income threshold ܫ∗, we get  
ܫ∗ ൌ 2ߠ െ 1.        (11) 
 Combining our results from sections 3 and 4 with equation (11), we conclude that all 
individuals in our aggregate economy who have incomes higher than the threshold level ܫ∗ will 
choose to live in the urban region and those who have incomes that are less than this same 
11 
 
threshold will choose to live in the adjoining rural region. Our final task in this paper is to show 
that in the equilibrium with income sorting, it is possible to make everyone in our aggregate 
economy better off by slightly modifying their residential choices.  
6. Making Everyone Better Off 
 The reader should understand that the equilibrium with income sorting11 that we have 
been studying thus far cannot be improved upon by moving only one individual from one region 
to the other. This is because the equilibrium under study is individually rational which means 
that no individual wishes to move given the living choices of all the other individuals in our 
aggregate economy.  
 Therefore, to make everyone better off, it will be necessary to move a group of 
individuals from one region to the other. Specifically, suppose we move all individuals to the 
rural region. This move clearly raises the utility of all current rural region residents because the 
mean income rises. But what can we say about the utility of current urban region residents? 
Mathematically, our proposed move to the rural region benefits an arbitrary urban region 
resident with income ܫ as long as the inequality 
ሺ1 ൅ ܫሻሺ1.5ሻ െ ܿோ ൐ ሺ1 ൅ ܫሻሺ1.5 ൅ 0.5ܫ∗ሻ െ ܿோ െ ߠ   (12) 
is satisfied.  
 From equation (11), we know that ܫ∗ ൌ 2ߠ െ 1. Using this value to simplify the 
inequality in (12), we get  
 
ଵ
ଶఏିଵ ൐ ܫ.       (13) 
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This “income sorting equilibrium” can also be thought of as a “location equilibrium.”  
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Inspecting the inequality in (13), we see that the ratio on the left-hand-side (LHS) attains a 
minimum of 1 when ߠ ൌ 1. Therefore, this inequality is clearly satisfied for all incomes ܫ ൑ 1. 
This last result shows that situating the entire population in our aggregate economy in the rural 
region is, in our model, a better outcome than the outcome in which the individuals live in both 
regions.  
 The result we have just obtained is a limiting result and hence it ought not to be 
interpreted literally. That said, if we think of the urban region in terms of its central business 
district (CBD) then this result is consistent with an empirical feature of the CBDs of many North 
American cities. What we mean by this observation is that many of these CBDs are veritable 
“ghost towns” after office hours because most of the office workers who work in these CBDs do 
not actually live in or around these CBDs but commute in from elsewhere.12 This completes our 
discussion of preference matching, income, and population distribution in urban and adjoining 
rural regions. 
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we studied the effect of preference matching and income on the distribution 
of the population in an aggregate economy consisting of an urban and an adjacent rural region. It 
was more expensive to live in the urban region than in the rural region. Individuals chose freely 
to live either in the urban or in the rural region. They differed in their incomes and these incomes 
were uniformly distributed on the interval ሾ0, 1ሿ. Our analysis led to four findings. First, when 
the cost differential parameter ߠ satisfied a particular condition, both regions were occupied in 
the equilibrium. Second, once again when this same parametric condition was satisfied, in any 
equilibrium in which the mean income of individuals varied across the two regions, every 
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See Polese (2014), Pham (2015), and Carmody (2016) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim. 
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resident of the rural region had a lower income than every resident of the urban region. Third, 
there existed an income threshold ܫ∗ and all individuals with higher (lower) incomes chose to 
live in the urban (rural) region. Finally, in the equilibrium with income sorting, it was possible to 
make everyone better off by slightly modifying their residential choices.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
two suggestions for extending the research described here. First, consistent with our observations 
in footnote 10, it would be useful to explicitly model the commuting decisions of individuals 
who live in one region but work in the other. In this case, the net utility functions of the different 
individuals would display the phenomenon of preference matching and aversion to long 
commute times. Second, following the work of Batabyal (2018), it would be helpful to study a 
scenario in which the decision to live in either the rural or the urban region is based on the 
differential valuation placed by the individuals in our aggregate economy on the provision of one 
or more local public goods. Studies that analyze these aspects of the underlying problem about 
individual living choices will increase our understanding of the connections between preference 
based behavior on the one hand and the residential appeal of both rural and urban regions on the 
other.  
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